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Rule 37(f) Meets Its Critics:   
The Justification for a Limited Preservation Safe 
Harbor for ESI 
Thomas Y. Allman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 As of December 1, 2006, Rule 37(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 
37(f)” or “the Rule”) will provide protection against rule-based sanctions for a party’s 
inability to provide electronically stored information (“ESI”) in discovery when that 
information has been lost as a result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic 
information system.1  This limitation reflects a concern that the threat of sanctions in 
those circumstances unfairly impacts primary conduct – the way in which users of 
electronically stored information manage their storage and retention of information.2  
While the frequency of the risk of sanctions in those circumstances is debatable - the 
reported cases are few – the issue to which the reassurance of Rule 37(f) is directed is the 
distortion of primary conduct resulting from that threat.3  
¶2 A number of criticisms have been levied at Rule 37(f).  For example, two typical 
criticisms are set forth in the Spring 2006 issue of the Northwestern Journal of 
Technology and Intellectual Property.  The first, by the quasi-official historian of the E-
 
 *  ©2006 Thomas Y. Allman.  Mr. Allman is currently Senior Counsel to Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw 
LLP. He previously served as Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of BASF Corporation from 1993 
until 2004 and was an early advocate for e-discovery amendments.  See Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for 
Federal Standards for Electronic Discovery, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 209 (2001).  He is also a member of 
the Steering Committee of the Working Group on Best Practices for Electronic Document Retention & 
Production of the Sedona Conference, authors of the “Sedona Principles.”  
 1 Rule 37(f) will read in full as follows: “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose 
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result 
of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system.”  In this paper I sometimes refer to 
the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as “the Rules” and the proposed 
amendment to Rule 37 as simply “the Rule.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
 2 Given the potential volumes of ESI involved, and the uncertainties over “triggering” events, an 
inflexible preservation standard broking no exceptions can be met only by either saving information that is 
not required to be saved (“over-preservation”) or by ignoring potential risks of sanctions and facing the 
prospect of having to settle cases on unfavorable terms if one “guesses wrong.”  Neither prospect is fair and 
Rule 37(f) is intended to bring some relief from this “Hobson’s choice.”  See Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. 
Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of Applying Traditional Doctrines of Spoliation to Electronic 
Discovery, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, at ¶ 6 (2006) (contending that Rule 37(f) fails to “thoroughly address 
the problem”).  
 3 As a Member of the Advisory Committee noted, “[t]here is real benefit in reassuring parties that if they 
respond to litigation reasonably, they will be protected.”  See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee 
Meeting (Apr. 15-16, 2004), at 20, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0404.pdf 
[hereinafter “Advisory Committee Minutes (April 2004)”]. 
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Discovery rules process, Kenneth Withers, argues that Rule 37 falls “far short of that 
[which] the original proponents had wanted”4 and is unworthy of the label “safe harbor.”5  
The second, outlined by Nathan Drew Larsen, analyzes the efficacy of the Rule under the 
Rules Enabling Act and argues that it raises the specter of possible “collusion” among 
producers to “configure” their systems to destroy data.6  
¶3 These observations – implying that the Rule is both ineffective and dangerous at 
the same time - miss the mark and deserve a response.  In this article, I evaluate the 
quality and accuracy of the criticisms.  Part II examines the Rule as promulgated by the 
Supreme Court.  Part III traces the Rule’s evolution and Part IV examines the common 
criticisms of the Rule and explains why they are unfounded. Part V concludes by 
explaining why the Rule satisfies appropriate and achievable objectives in a manner 
which will be useful to all courts facing similar issues. 
II. RULE 37(F) 
¶4 Rule 37(f) was drafted by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (“Advisory 
Committee”) at its meeting in April, 20057 after consideration of comments on an initial 
proposal made at Public Hearings held by the Committee in San Francisco, Dallas and 
Washington, D.C.8  The Advisory Committee is one of several committees formed by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Judicial Conference”)9 to study potential 
changes in the rules of practice and procedure in specific fields10 and is empowered to 
submit rule proposals to the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (the “Standing Committee”) for review and approval.  Rule 37(f) was 
subsequently endorsed (along with the other proposed e-discovery Rules)11 by the 
Standing Committee12 and, after a favorable recommendation by the Judicial Conference, 
 
 4 Kenneth Withers, Electronically Stored Information:  The December 2006 Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 208 (2006). 
 5 Withers prefers to call Rule 37(f) a “lighthouse,” picking up on terminology suggested at a Sedona 
Conference discussion of the topic.  See Kenneth Withers, We’ve Moved the Two Tiers and Filled in the 
Safe Harbor, 52 FED. LAWYER 50, 54 (2005) (the phrase “safe harbor” is “no longer apt, if it ever was”).  
 6 Nathan Drew Larsen, Evaluating The Proposed Changes to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37:  
Spoliation, Routine Operation and the Rules Enabling Act, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP 212, 223-224 
& 226 (2006). 
 7 See generally Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee (Apr. 14-15, 2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0405.pdf  [hereinafter “Advisory Committee Minutes (April 
2005)”]. 
 8 Copies of the comments and transcripts of the remarks of over 200 witnesses are available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html [hereinafter “Public Hearing Comments”]. The comments 
present a valuable snapshot of e-discovery concerns and current practices as of 2005 and contain insightful 
observations which played a role in formulation of the final form of the Amendments.     
 9 The Judicial Conference of the United States is composed of the Chief Judges from each Circuit along 
with District Court representatives and is charged by statute with the responsibility to “carry on a 
continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure.”  28 U.S.C. § 
331 (2006). 
 10 Other Advisory Committees have jurisdiction over proposed rules for Appellate Practice and for 
Bankruptcy, Criminal and Evidence  matters.  See Federal Rulemaking, http://www.uscourts.gov.  
 11 Rule 37(f) is part of an integrated package of amendments to Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45 and Form 
35.  See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf. 
 12 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at Rules App. C-83 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter “STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT 
Vol. 5:1] Thomas Y. Allman 
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by the Supreme Court in April, 200613  Assuming no complications, Rule 37(f) will come 
into effect in December, 2006.14   
¶5 Requests for spoliation sanctions15 are often sought where an inability to produce 
ESI during discovery results from a failure to preserve a source of ESI before active 
discovery is undertaken.  The Rule does not differentiate between losses of ESI which are 
caused by events that occur before institution of litigation and those that occur 
afterwards.  It also applies only to motions seeking “sanctions,” and not to “the kinds of 
adjustments frequently made in managing discovery if a party is unable to provide 
responsive information.”16   
¶6 Rule 37(f) is intended to serve as part of a solution to the practical problems of ESI 
preservation and production.17  The Advisory Committee chose not to enact detailed 
preservation rules but instead established a framework to encourage early voluntary 
agreement on preservation steps.  Rule 26(f) establishes a “new paradigm”18 of 
mandatory discussion of preservation and production issues involving ESI, which will 
hopefully yield an accommodation on preservation steps satisfactory to both parties.  If 
not, the Court is empowered to enter specific orders to guide the parties.19  A requesting 
party failing to identify or act on preservation issues will not be allowed to take a 
“gotcha” or ambush approach by waiting until too late to raise preservation issues.20   
 
(2005)”].  The Standing Committee Report (2005) contains, as Appendix C, the May 27, 2005, Report of 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, amended July 25, 2005 [hereinafter “ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT 
(2005)”].  That Report contains the final form of Rule 37(f) and the related Committee Note and is an 
indispensable source of background and interpretive information regarding its evolution. 
 13 See Transmittal Letters to Congress and Supreme Court Orders, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Letters_Orders.pdf. 
 14 Under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077, inaction by Congress will lead to the 
proposed Rules becoming effective on December 1, 2006.   
 15 See William Robinson, An Overview of Electronic Discovery, 841 PLI/PAT 189 (2005)  (collecting 
cases). 
 16 These types of adjustments do not involve risk of case-ending spoliation sanctions that underlie the 
need for Rule 37(f).  See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-88 (“[A] 
court [can] order the responding party to produce an additional witness for deposition, respond to additional 
interrogatories or make similar attempts to provide substitutes or alternatives for some or all of the lost 
information.”). 
 17 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-83 (“[I]t can be difficult to 
interrupt the routine operation of computer systems to isolate and preserve discrete parts of the information 
they overwrite, delete, or update on an ongoing basis, without creating problems for the larger system. . . 
[and it] is also undesirable; the result would be even greater accumulation of duplicative and irrelevant data 
that must be reviewed, making discovery more expensive and time-consuming.”).  The Standing 
Committee Report (2005) contains both the final version of the Rules and the Committee Notes as 
promulgated and the introductory explanations to the Judicial Conference not found on the Administrative 
Office site noted above. 
 18 See Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 13 (2006) (arguing that requesting parties must do a better job of articulating their discovery focus 
and producing parties must be prepared to candidly discuss steps taken to preserve source of potentially 
discoverable evidence). 
 19 A related requirement in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) that a producing party must identify any potentially 
relevant inaccessible sources of ESI that it will not search means that contentious issues about preservation 
of those sources will also surface early.  See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at 
Rules App. C-48 (“Whether a responding party is required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially 
responsive information that it believes are not reasonably accessible depends on the circumstances of each 
case.  It is often useful for the parties to discuss this issue early in discovery.”). 
 20  See generally Treppel v. Biovail, 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (criticizing requesting party’s 
failure to even discuss search terms proposed by producing party as a “missed opportunity”). 
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¶7 Accordingly, the need to invoke Rule 37(f) will hopefully exist only in isolated 
instances, such as challenges to preservation steps taken or not taken concerning 
inaccessible sources of information in the absent of an agreement or court order.21  When 
invoked, Rule 37(f) will involve a two-step analysis.   
¶8 First, a Court must determine if sanctions for the failure to produce lie pursuant to 
one of the provisions of the Federal Rules.  
¶9 Second, a Court applying Rule 37(f) must determine whether, under all the 
circumstances, the failure to produce ESI in discovery resulted from circumstances which 
fall within the scope of the Rule.  This will turn on whether the loss resulted from a 
“routine” and “good faith” operation of a covered “information system” and has not 
resulted in “exceptional circumstances.” 
A. Information Systems 
¶10 An “information system” creates and manages electronically stored data, whether 
in the form of email, raw data, images or other electronic form.  A wide variety of such 
systems are typically used to perform the range of important business and regulatory 
functions within an entity.  As a normal or “routine” part of the operation of such 
systems, data is overwritten, deleted or modified by automatic or manually initiated 
processes, pursuant to the design or programming of the operating software.22  The use of 
the phrase “routine operation” in reference to such an information system emerged during 
discussions at the April 2004 Advisory Committee meeting23 to describe the normal 
aspects of systems that might result in data losses and which should be presumptively 
subject to the safe harbor under discussion.24  Serving in that role, the phrase was part of 
the initial Rule 37(f) proposal published for Public Comment25 and ultimately survived 
the subsequent revisions as a basic concept in Rule 37(f).26   
¶11 The Committee Note to Rule 37(f) is neutral as to information technology, so it 
does not list specific examples of systems the Advisory Committee had in mind.  
However, the Standing Committee Report to the Judicial Conference mentions “programs 
 
 21 As a practical matter, in most instances preservation of reasonably accessible sources of discoverable 
information will be sufficient and it will not be necessary to take steps to preserve inaccessible sources.   
See Thomas Y. Allman, New Rules Should Clarify Expectations, LAW TECH. NEWS (Aug. 2005) 
(“preservation obligations will take into consideration not only the potential relevance of information, but 
also its accessibility”).  The Committee Note to Rule 37(f) states that inaccessible sources need be 
preserved only if a party “reasonably believes that the information on such sources is likely to be 
discoverable and not available from reasonably accessible sources.”  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT 
(2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-87. 
 22 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-86-87. 
 23 See Advisory Committee Minutes (April 2004), supra note 3. 
 24 See Memorandum from Myles V. Lynk & Richard L. Marcus to the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules (Apr. 5, 2004), at 35 (recommending alternative language preventing imposition of sanctions where 
“failure resulted from the normal operation of the person’s electronic information system”), available at 
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus040604.pdf.  
 25 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE (May 17, 2004, revised Aug. 3, 2004) (containing final version of Rule 37(f) as issued for 
public comment), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf [hereinafter 
“ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004)”],.   
 26 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at 88 (“The present proposal carries 
forward a central part of the published proposal – the information must have been lost in the system’s 
‘routine operation.’”).  
Vol. 5:1] Thomas Y. Allman 
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that recycle storage media kept for brief periods against the possibility of a disaster that 
broadly affects computer operations“ and “programs that automatically discard 
information that has not been accessed within a defined period” as examples of “routine” 
operations in current technology.27    
¶12 The fact that human involvement is part of the process does not make the operation 
causing the failure other than “routine,” as is shown by the reference to the recycling of 
backup media, which is instituted by members of an IT function pursuant to a retention 
schedule.28  The “routine” aspect of the operation is the physical recycling process.  
Similarly, the pressing of the “delete” key by users initiates a “routine” feature of the 
email system, incidental to its operation.”29   
¶13 In other words, the issue under Rule 37(f) is whether the feature causing 
destruction is a normal part of that process, not whether some other approach could have 
been used.  A feature added to an existing system solely for the purpose of deleting 
information needed in litigation would receive short shrift.30 
B. Culpability 
¶14 The key differentiating factor in applying Rule 37(f), however, is the presence or 
absence of “good faith” in the routine operation of the information system.  It is only 
those losses resulting from “good faith” operations which are exempted from sanctions.  
It is clear that mere negligence or inadvertence in operating an otherwise reasonable 
information system does not bar a finding that the entity was acting in good faith.  As a 
Member of the Advisory Committee stated during the April 2005 meeting of the 
Advisory Committee, “[G]ood faith lies at a point intermediate between negligence and 
recklessness.  It assumes the party has a reasonable litigation hold, and did not 
deliberately use the system’s routine destruction functions. ‘If you know it will disappear 
and do nothing, that is not good faith…[t]he line is conscious awareness the system will 
destroy information.’”31  Rule 37(f) thus represents the state of mind which must exist to 
be exempt from sanctions.32   
 
 27 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-83. 
 28 The draft Committee Note to Rule 37(f), written after the April 2005 meeting, referred to “automatic 
features” in routine operations.  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at 87.  The 
reference to “automatic” was deleted from the final draft of the Committee Note to emphasize that human 
involvement is not a disqualification.  Thus, the final Committee Note simply refers to “features” which are 
“essential to the operation of electronic information systems.”  ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), 
supra note 12, at 106. 
 29 See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick, No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *6 (E.D. Ark. 1997) 
(fact that employees decide whether or not to delete email does not require finding of bad faith when some 
email is lost);  Ian C. Ballon, How Companies Can Reduce the Costs and Risks Associated with Electronic 
Discovery, 15 COMPUTER LAW. 8 (1998) (arguing that email deletion is not equivalent to document 
destruction).    
 30 See Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) (a corporation cannot blindly 
destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seeming innocuous document retention policy);  See also 
Mastercard Int’l v. Moulton & KTM Media, No. 03 Civ. 3613 VMMHD, 2004 WL 1393992 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (deliberate and inexcusable conduct in consciously deleting information). 
 31 Advisory Committee Minutes (2005), supra note 7, at 42.   
 32 As a practical matter, Rule 37(f) limits the impact of Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge 
Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107-8 (2d Cir. 2002) (adverse inference can be granted for negligent 
conduct), in the context of “routine, good faith” loss of ESI from information systems.  Interestingly, since 
Residential Funding provided the rule of decision for Zubulake v. US Warburg, LLC (Zubulake V), 229 
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¶15 Determining the application of Rule 37(f) requires an assessment as to whether the 
features causing the loss were operated without a disqualifying culpability.33  In making 
the assessment, the issue should be whether the process involved was “reasonably 
calculated” to achieve its goals, not whether perfect results were achieved.34   
C. Exceptional Circumstances 
¶16  Rule 37(f) will not apply in those rare circumstances where the conduct of the 
party seeking relief from sanctions has resulted in such a degree of prejudice that it is 
unfair to restrict the power of the court.  The Standing Committee Report to the Judicial 
Conference explained that the clause was added to provide “flexibility” in the event of 
“serious prejudice” resulting from the loss.35 
III. EVOLUTION OF RULE 37(F) 
¶17 Before turning to the specific criticisms of the Rule, it is helpful to understand its 
evolution during the five years preceding adoption in April, 2005. 
A. Original Proposals 
¶18 The roots of Rule 37(f) can be fairly traced to the mini-conferences held by the 
Discovery Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee at its request36 at Hastings37 and 
Brooklyn38 Law schools during 2000.  Both mini-conferences featured panels of judges, 
lawyers and technical consultants with extensive experience in e-discovery and both 
identified issues about meeting preservation expectations as major concerns.    
 
F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), one can speculate about whether  a different form of sanction might have been 
considered in that case had Rule 37(f) been in effect at that time. 
 33 As the Standing Committee Report explained, “The Advisory Committee [in enacting Rule 37(f)] 
revised Rule 37(f) to adopt a culpability standard intermediate between the two published versions [of 
culpability].”  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-84-85.   
 34 See Thomas Y. Allman, Ruling Offers Lessons for Counsel on Electronic Discovery Abuse, 19 WASH. 
LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, at 3 (Oct. 14, 2004) (“where there is uncertainty about the timing 
and nature of disputes and the individuals involved, a sliding scale approach balancing the type of case 
involved with the number of sources of potentially discovery information is sufficient to meet preservation 
requirements”), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/101504LBAllman.pdf.  
 35 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-85 (“The exceptional 
circumstances provision adds flexibility not included in the published drafts”) and Rules App. C-86 (“This 
provision recognizes that in some circumstances a court should provide remedies to protect an entirely 
innocent party requesting discovery against serious prejudice arising from the loss of potentially important 
information.”). 
 36 The Advisory Committee assigned to its Discovery Subcommittee the task of identifying any “issues 
peculiar to electronic discovery that might justify rules amendments” at its October 1999 Meeting in 
Kennebunkport, Maine.  Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting (Oct. 14-15, 1999), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/1099mnCV.pdf. 
 37 Minutes, Discovery Subcommittee Meeting at Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 
27, 2000).  A summary of the remarks prepared by an attendee (Andrew Mastin of Pillsbury, Madison & 
Sutro) is on file with the author. 
 38 Minutes, Discovery Subcommittee Meeting at Brooklyn Law School, New York, N.Y. (Oct. 27, 
2000).  A summary of the remarks prepared by an attendee (Ashish Prasad of Mayer, Brown & Platt) is on 
file with the author. 
Vol. 5:1] Thomas Y. Allman 
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¶19 In December 2000, after reflecting on discussions at the Brooklyn Conference and 
my experiences as one responsible for litigation compliance,39 I wrote to (then) 
Magistrate Judge John Carroll, Chair of the Discovery Subcommittee40 to suggest 
adoption of a targeted safe harbor rule exempting the continued good faith operation of 
disaster recovery and other systems from rule-based sanctions unless a prior order was 
issued requiring their preservation.41  I also suggested that only willful violations of 
preservation orders should justify imposition of sanctions.  As far as I can tell, this was 
the first explicit suggestion for a preservation safe harbor, which I amplified in other 
articles.42   
¶20 The ensuing period saw case law evolve on a number of basic e-discovery issues43 
in District Court opinions44 and enactment of some local rules on specific aspects of e-
discovery.45  It was also during this period that the Sedona Conference®46 was organized 
 
 39 At the time, I was serving as both a General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer of a large 
corporation and had encountered many of the concerns discussed at Brooklyn. 
 40 Judge Carroll now serves as Dean of the Cumberland School of Law of Sanford University, located in 
Birmingham, Alabama.  See http://cumberland.samford.edu (last accessed July 26, 2006). 
 41 See Letter, Thomas Allman to The Hon. John L. Carroll, U.S. Magistrate Judge (Dec. 12, 2000), 
available at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles (“no sanctions or other relief” should be “predicated upon 
a failure to maintain or preserve documents or data, including electronically stored information,” without 
proof of a “willful failure to preserve such documents or data” in response to a specific document request 
and a party need not “suspend or alter the operation in good faith of disaster recovery or electronic or 
computer systems absent a court order issued upon good cause shown.”  Evidence of reasonable steps being 
taken to notify computer custodians of relevant preservation obligations would serve as “prima facie 
evidence of compliance” with those preservation obligations.). 
 42 See Allman, supra note *, at 206 (suggesting a limitation in Rule 34 on the need to suspend or alter 
“the operation in good faith of disaster recovery or other electronic or computer systems absent court order 
issued upon good cause shown”).  See also Thomas Y. Allman, The Case for a Preservation Safe Harbor in 
Requests for E-Discovery, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 417 (2003); Thomas Y. Allman, A Preservation Safe Harbor 
in e-Discovery, ANTITRUST SOURCE (July 2003) (emphasizing the use of the “accessibility” to identify the 
types of information to which preservation obligations should presumptively attach). 
 43 The concept of the “accessibility” of electronically stored information was used in the first Zubulake 
decision to differentiate among various types of storage media in regard to cost-shifting. See Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Inherent in such an assessment was the 
concept of avoiding undue burden or cost, which ultimately was adopted in proposed Rule 26(b)(2)(B) as 
the differentiating factor between the “two-tiers” of ESI discovery.  For example, in Medtronic Sofamor 
Danek, Inc. v. Gary Karlin Michelson et al., No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. 
2003), the District Court found it to be an “undue” burden to require the restoration of the 996 network 
backup tapes at issue and ordered cost-sharing under a formula subject to a protocol. 
 44 The limits of the case by case method in regard to e-discovery law is described vividly and with a 
great deal of insight in Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-Discovery 
Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, at ¶ 29 (2004) (“As in other contexts, there are four reasons why we will 
get very old if we wait for the adjudicative process to finish that task [developing e-discovery principles].  
First, ‘most reported discovery cases come from trial courts and have little precedential value.’  Second, 
there is generally very little guidance from courts of appeals, because few discovery cases get appealed.  
Third, when such cases are appealed, the level of appellate review is deferential, leaving most discovery 
determinations within the discretion of the trial judge.  Fourth, the reported decisions tend to involve 
obstructionist conduct at the most egregious end of the spectrum, thus arguably offering insufficient 
guidance to those acting in a mainstream manner.”). 
 45 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12.  The District Courts in Arkansas, 
Wyoming, Kansas and New Jersey promulgated a variety of Local Rules and procedures and the District 
Court of Delaware, through its Chief Judge, promulgated a default standard for parties that could not agree. 
 46 The Sedona Conference is the author of various resources related to the discovery of ESI, most 
notably the Sedona Principles, issued in draft form in early 2003 and in final form in January 2004, 
containing fourteen “best practice” recommendations.  See generally The Sedona Principles:  Best Practice 
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production (Sedona Conference 
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and bar associations, legal publications and litigation support vendors held scores of 
conferences on e-discovery.47  A key milestone was the publication of the “prescient”48 
Law Journal article on e-discovery by Northwestern Law Professor Martin C. Redish.49  
Professor Redish famously noted that society and the rule-making process must be 
prepared to limit the search for truth to take into account other elements of the litigation 
matrix, such as the need to provide predictable standards of primary behavior.50   
¶21 In April 2003, after soliciting and receiving further input on the topic,51 the 
Discovery Subcommittee informed the Advisory Committee that “after more than three 
years of considering these issues, the Subcommittee believes that the time for more 
concrete action has arrived.”52  The Subcommittee delivered a comprehensive set of 
proposals for consideration by the Advisory Committee in September 200353 and after 
preliminary review at its October 2003 meeting,54 the Advisory Committee scheduled a 
two-day Conference on E-Discovery at Fordham University Law School (the “Fordham 
Conference”) for February 2004 to discuss them. 
 
B. The Fordham Conference 
¶22 The Fordham Conference was attended by a cross-section of the bench and bar with 
members of the Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference. Members of the 
technical and consulting community were also present.  Participants were furnished with 
copies of the Subcommittee proposals in advance of the meeting.   
 
Working Group Series, 2005 Version), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org [hereinafter 
“Sedona Principles”].  See also ABA Civil Discovery Standards, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. ELEC. DISCOVERY 
TASK FORCE, Report 103B, Amendments to the Civil Discovery Standards (revised Aug. 2004). 
 47 Kenneth Withers, Two Tiers and a Safe Harbor: Federal Rulemakers Grapple with E-Discovery, FED. 
LAWYER, at 3 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/tf/0904.pdf. 
 48 See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 22 (noting that Prof. Redish’s article preceded rash of e-
discovery cases); see also Martino v. Wal-Mart, 908 So. 2d 342, 347 (Fla. 2005) (Wells, J., concurring) 
(citing Redish article as basis for raising “serious constitutional and practical concerns” regarding assertion 
that preservation duties were triggered two years before filing of suit). 
 49 Martin Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561 (2001) (criticizing a 
strict liability rule requiring constant review of backup media for documents that could at some later point 
be deemed relevant upon threat of sanctions for incorrect predictions). 
 50 Id. at 623. 
 51 For example, Lawyers for Civil Justice (“LCJ”), a defense oriented coalition of corporate and outside 
counsel and the leadership of various defense bar groups emphasized the need for a safe harbor.  LCJ 
pointed out inconsistent jurisprudence on the application of preservation obligations and listed specific 
anecdotal instances of the need for relief.  Suggested amendments included a “safe harbor” which would 
exempt a producing party from sanctions “for the continued good faith operation of business systems 
absent a specific order or unobjected discovery demand which was willfully disregarded.”  See Letter, Rex 
Lindner, President LCJ, to Peter McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
December 2002, reproduced in LCJ Comments to Civil Rules Advisory Committee (Mar. 12, 2004)  (on 
file with author). 
 52  Myles V. Lynk & Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Subcommittee Report on Electronic Discovery (Apr. 
14, 2003), available at http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/index.html. 
 53 Memorandum from Rick Marcus to Advisory Committee, E-Discovery Rule Discussion Proposals 
(Sept. 15, 2003) available at http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus091503b.pdf.   
 54  See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting (Oct. 2-3, 2004) (“The central focus [of the 
Fordham Conference] will be to advise the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee whether we 
need rules, and if so what the rules might be.”).  
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¶23 In regard to preservation and spoliation issues, the Subcommittee recommended 
altering Rule 26 or adding a new Rule 34.1 to emphasize that parties need not suspend 
the “operation in good faith” of “disaster recovery or other [computer] systems” provided 
that one day’s backup was retained.  The proposal also stated that information in 
inaccessible form did not have to be preserved unless a court ordered the party to do so.55   
As a second and “complementary” step to these changes, the Subcommittee also 
recommended that a new Rule 37(f) be added to make it clear that no sanctions would be 
issued for a failure to produce ESI unless the party “willfully or recklessly” deleted or 
otherwise made ESI unavailable after having been served with a request that described it 
with reasonable certainty.56  
¶24 A separate panel discussion at the Fordham Conference was devoted to safe harbor 
issues, with the author participating.57  Not surprisingly, the panelists were not in 
complete agreement either on the need for a safe harbor rule or on the specific 
components required should one be adopted.58   
C. Published Proposals - August 2004 
¶25 The Advisory Committee met in April 200459 to decide whether to initiate the 
rulemaking process.  The Discovery Subcommittee had met prior to the meeting and a 
revised set of e-discovery recommendations was before the Advisory Committee.60  By 
the conclusion of the meeting, it had agreed to proceed and had settled on a proposed 
package of e-discovery amendments, including a proposed Rule 37(f) and related 
Committee Note.61  These materials were ultimately published by the Standing 
Committee (along with proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy, Criminal and Evidence 
rules) in August 2004 with public comments due by mid-February 2005.62   
 
 55 See Participant Memoradum, Conference on Electronic Discovery, Fordham Law School, New York, 
N.Y. (Feb. 20-21, 2004), at 34-38, available at http://uscourts.gov/rules/E-
Discovery_Conf_Agenda_Materials.pdf. 
 56 Id. at 39. 
 57 See Panel Discussions: Panel Four: Rule 37 and/or A New Rule 34.1: Safe Harbors for E-Document 
Preservation and Sanctions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (2004) (quoting panel members Andrew Scherffius 
(Moderator), Thomas Allman, Stephen Morrison, Laura Owens and Anthony Tarricone) [hereinafter 
“Panel Discussions”]. 
 58 Id. at 73-83. Compare Comments by Tarricone (accusing the panel of losing its ‘moral compass” 
since the safe harbor will allow regular suspension policies to continue without concern for public safety, 
public interest and public good) with Comments by Allman (parties which engage in good faith efforts to 
preserve information should not be sanctioned if it turns out later, judging in retrospect, that the 
information was not adequately preserved). 
 59 See Advisory Committee Minutes (April 2004), supra 4, at 22. 
 60 See Lynk & Marcus, supra note 52, at 36.  (The Subcommittee abandoned its suggestion for a 
separate rule entitled a “Duty to Preserve” and noted that “a preservation duty might look odd if it 
purported to regulate a party’s behavior before a suit was filed in federal court.  Limiting the use of 
sanctions should pose fewer difficulties than trying to articulate a duty of preservation . . . “). 
 61 The initial Advisory Committee Report prepared after the Advisory Committee Meeting but before 
the Standing Committee meeting was dated May 17, 2004.  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004), 
supra note 25. 
 62  The initial Advisory Committee Report was revised on August 3, 2004 after discussions with the 
Standing Committee.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004), supra note 25.  The Standing Committee 
Request for Comments included both the Civil Rules report and the reports regarding the respective 
proposed amendments to Bankruptcy, Criminal and Evidence rules.  Standing Committee Request for 
Comments (Aug. 9, 2004) (on file with author).   
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¶26 Proposed Rule 37(f) provided, in relevant part, that “. . . a court may not impose 
sanctions under these rules on the [producing] party for failing to provide [ESI] if: (1) the 
party took reasonable steps to preserve the information after it knew or should have 
known the information was discoverable in the action; and (2) the failure resulted from 
loss of the information because of the routine operation of the party’s electronic 
information system.”   
¶27 Some Members at the Advisory Committee meeting objected to attaching 
disqualifying consequences to the lower range of the “fault” spectrum (negligence)63 and 
insisted that only willful or reckless conduct should deny protection under Rule 37(f).  
Accordingly, the Advisory Committee prepared and the Standing Committee approved 
inclusion of a footnote requesting comments “on whether the culpability or fault that 
takes a party outside any safe harbor should be something higher than negligence64 and 
included an example “to focus comments and suggestions.”65   
¶28 The Advisory Committee did not promulgate a separate rule spelling out 
preservation obligations.  Instead, the proposed Committee Note described a three part 
analysis for use in evaluating the reasonable steps needed to preserve electronically 
stored information.66  First, the outer limit of information to be preserved would be 
determined by the existing limits on the scope of discovery established by Rule 
26(b)(1).67  Second, given that amended Rule 26(b)(2) conditioned the discovery of 
inaccessible ESI on issuance of a court order, the Note observed that “[i]n most instances, 
a party acts reasonably by identifying and preserving reasonably accessible electronically 
stored information that is discoverable without court order.”68 The third factor was what 
the party then knew about the nature of the litigation, which “should inform its judgment 
about what subjects are pertinent to the action and which people and systems are likely to 
have relevant information.”69  
 
 63 See Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that destruction of potentially 
relevant evidence can occur along a “continuum of fault” ranging from innocence through the degrees of 
negligence to intentionality with resulting penalties which vary correspondingly). 
 64 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004), supra note 25, at 32. 
 65 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004), supra note 25, at 32-33.  In relevant part, the alternative 
provided that “[a]court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide 
electronically stored information deleted or lost as a result of the routine operation of the party’s electronic 
information system unless (1) the party intentionally or recklessly failed to preserve the information; or (2) 
the party violated an order in the action requiring the preservation of the information.” 
 66 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004), supra note 25, at  34. 
 67 Rule 26(b)(1) limits party managed discovery to “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the 
claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody , condition, and location 
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identify and location of persons having 
knowledge of any discoverable matter.”  A court may order “discovery of any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action” for good cause.  The Amendments do not change this provision. 
 68 The draft Committee Note to Rule 37(f) acknowledged, however, that in some instances, “reasonable 
care” may require preservation of electronically stored information that is not reasonably accessible if the 
party “knew or should have known” that it was “discoverable in the action and could not be obtained 
elsewhere.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004) supra note 25, at 34-35 (preservation may be less 
burdensome than access and is necessary to support discovery if good cause is shown). 
 69 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004), supra note 25, at 35. 
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D. The 2005 Public Hearings and Comments 
¶29 The response to Rule 37(f) was mixed at the public hearings held in San Francisco, 
Dallas and Washington in January and February 2005.  Representatives of public and 
private entities generally favored some form of safe harbor, noting that the fear of 
sanctions for inadvertent loss of ESI had created an unfair chilling effect70 and had 
distorted business processes by encouraging over-retention of information. 
¶30 However, some supporters of the safe harbor concept also expressed concern about 
the fact that, as written, the protection afforded by Rule 37(f) apparently could be lost by 
merely negligent or inadvertent conduct.71  A typical comment was made by a 
representative of The City of New York Law Department, which argued that it was unfair 
to subject a party to sanctions for the conduct of a low level employee who may 
negligently delete electronic information despite reasonable preservation efforts by City 
attorneys and management personnel.72  
¶31 Some opponents argued that there was no empirical proof of a need to act based on 
the paucity of reported decisions citing entities for anything other than willful 
misconduct.73  Others argued that proposed Rules 26(b)(2) and 37(f) would encourage 
corporate entities to shift information from being reasonably accessible to becoming 
increasingly inaccessible, with the additional burden of access being imposed on the 
requesting party.74  Some commentators also criticized the Committee Note for failing to 
adequately state the need to preserve inaccessible information for later review to 
determine if it should be produced.75     
 
 70 As a representative of the Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) noted, “[B]usinesses create 
records retention policies for many business-related reasons, having nothing to do with litigation [but] the 
threat that implementing even a legitimate policy could subject a company to sanctions, has delayed or 
even scuttled the implementation of corporate electronic data retention policies.  Public Hearing 
Comments, supra note 8, Testimony of Lawrence La Sala, Ass’t General Counsel, Textron (Feb. 11, 2005) 
(04-CV-095), at 369. 
 71 A representative of the Department of Justice noted, for example, that “[m]any federal agencies have 
large quantities of electronic data and are involved frequently in litigation  [and it] can be very difficult to 
disseminate discovery-related retention requirements to all relevant persons within an agency, particularly 
if multiple offices in various geographic locations are involved.”  Public Hearing Comments, supra note 8, 
Testimony of Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice (Feb. 15, 2005) (04-
CV-203), at 8-9.  
 72 Public Hearing Comments, supra note 8, Testimony of Lawrence S. Kahn, Chief Litigating Assistant, 
City of New York Law Department (Feb. 15, 2005) (04-CV-220), at 4-5. 
 73 A study published by an Advisory Committee Member during the debate noted that (based on 
reported decisions) courts did not sanction for the “smallest infractions,” although they sometimes 
“sanction[ed] negligent but prejudicial conduct.  See Shira Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic 
Discovery Sanctions in the Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. TELECOM. TECH. L. REV. 71, 94 (2004) 
(reporting on the results of a review of 45 Federal and 21 State sanction cases). 
 74 See, e.g., Ronald Hedges, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 139 (2005) (noting the 
ATLA argument that the amendments are an attempt to constrict plaintiffs rights to discovery); see also 
James Rooks, Abridged Too Far:  Discovery Rights and the Campaign for Special E-Discovery Rules, 
EDD 18 (Special Advertising Supplement) at EDD 21 (2005) (arguing that corporations will routinely 
purge information).   
 75 The assertion was that a party could label otherwise discoverable information as inaccessible, destroy 
it before discovery began and then plead that it did not know it was discoverable.  The Committee Notes to 
Rule 26(b)(2) and the Committee Note to Rule 37(f) were amended to emphasize that the underlying 
preservation obligations are not modified by the proposed rules and must be evaluated separately.  See 
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-85 (“To respond to concerns that 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 6  
 
 12 
E. Final Form of Rule 37(f) 
¶32  In the end, after considering the matter from all angles, the Advisory Committee 
decided to simplify Rule 37(f) during their meeting of April 2005.  The Committee 
dropped the reference to preservation obligations and court orders and adopted a concise 
rule limiting sanctions for losses resulting from the “routine, good faith” operation of an 
information system unless “exceptional circumstances” exist.76  The intention expressed 
at the meeting was to use “good faith” as a culpability excluder which would operate 
midway between denial of exemption for merely negligent conduct and one which would 
require proof of willful or reckless conduct.77  
¶33 The Committee Note to Rule 37(f) was also shortened, thus deleting the three-part 
analysis of preservation obligations.  New language was added to clarify that “[a] party’s 
identification of sources of electronically stored information as not reasonably accessible 
does not relieve the party of its common-law or statutory duties to preserve evidence.”78   
Finally, the affirmative role of good faith in determining how a party should react to 
those preservation obligations was added.79  
¶34 After some further minor modifications,80 the amended Rule 37(f) was submitted to 
and approved by the Standing Committee at its June 15-16, 2005 Meeting81 in its final 
form.82    
IV. CRITICISMS 
A. Limited Effectiveness 
¶35 Some have questioned whether Rule 37(f) was worth the effort.  For 
example, in his survey piece in the Spring Issue of this Journal, Ken Withers argues that 
 
the proposed rule [Rule 37(f)] would insulate routine destruction of information on sources a party 
identifies as not reasonably accessible, the Notes to both Rules 37(f) and 26(b)(2) have been revised to 
make clear that there is no necessary linkage between these rules.”).   
 76 The revised version of Rule 37(f), based on the alternative form proposed earlier, was proposed near 
the close of the meeting and adopted by a 9-2 vote in order to “recouple” the amendment to the rules 
package.  As revised, Rule 37(f) provides that: “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose 
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost solely as a 
result of the routine, good-faith operation of the party’s electronic information system.”  See Advisory 
Committee Minutes (April 2005), supra note 7, at 43. 
 77 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-85. 
 78 Id. 
 79 “Whether good faith would call for steps to prevent the loss of information on sources that the party 
believes are not reasonably accessible under Rule 26(b)(2) depends on the circumstances of each case.”  Id. 
at C-87.  The Note also points out that “good faith” may require active intervention in the routine operation 
of some systems to prevent the loss of information as part of a “litigation hold.”  Id. 
 80 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at 86.  The phrase “solely” was deleted 
and the reference to “an” electronic information system was substituted for “the party’s” information 
system. 
 81 See Minutes, Standing Committee Meeting (June 15-16, 2005), at 26-29.   
 82 For a pithy comparison between the August 2004 version of Rule 37(f) and the final form of Rule 
37(f) - and an explanation for the changes - see “Changes Made After Publication and Comment,” part of 
the Standing Committee Report at Rules App. C-88-89.  No comparable comparison exists to guide 
analysis of the changes in the Committee Notes (other than by physically comparing the Note reproduced 
in the Advisory Committee Report (2004) with the Note reproduced in the Standing Committee Report 
(2005).  
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the final Rule, with its qualifications, is ineffective and unnecessary.”83  In a variation on 
that theme, another recent article criticizes Rule 37(f) for not providing sufficient “bright 
line” preservation guidelines, especially in regard to inaccessible information.84  The 
authors of that article contend that proposed Rule 37(f) will have “little, if any, practical 
impact” because courts “will continue to have significant discretion to impose sanctions 
for a ‘wrong guess’ as to the precise moment when a litigation hold should be 
implemented.”85  Others argue that Rule 37(f) is too limited in its application.86 
¶36 These criticisms prompt several responses.  First, it is certainly true that Rule 
37(f) differs from the initial proposals which contemplated intervention to require 
suspension of routine operations of information systems only when and if a court ordered 
them for good cause.87  In this regard, the original proposals were more akin to the safe 
harbor in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “Reform Act”) which 
provides (as one alternative) an exemption from civil liability for forward-looking 
statements accompanied by appropriate cautionary language.88  This approach was 
ultimately rejected because of a concern it would lead to excessive resort to preservation 
orders.89  Accordingly, the more flexible but less predictable approach based on 
retrospective “good faith” standard for preservation efforts was substituted by Advisory 
Committee.  
¶37 It can be argued that the Committee approach is far more practical than the 
original suggestion.  Rule 37(f) is not tied to any particular technology or any particular 
set of preservation practices.90  New fact patterns will continue to evolve and Rule 37(f) 
 
 83 Withers, supra note 4, at 208.  Withers argues that Rule 37(f) “bears little resemblance to the model 
rule advocated by corporate defense attorneys early in the Advisory Committee’s five year study of 
electronic discovery.”  Id. at 207.  Withers calls the earlier proposals “a solution in search of a problem” 
because there was “no evidence that ‘case killer’ sanctions had ever been levied by a federal judge without 
a finding, express or implied, of gross negligence or intentional destruction.  Id. at 207-8.  He views current 
Rule 37(f) as not a safe harbor rule at all, but “more a framework for analysis, restating the law of sanctions 
in the spoliation context.”  Id. at 207.  With his emphasis only on reported decisions, not on the fear of such 
sanctions that actually motivates parties to avoid risking decisions, Withers falls into the same trap as 
others who have not had the responsibility for planning and implementation of preservation steps in the 
face of massive ESI demands.    
 84 See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at ¶ 55 (only practical effect is to encourage general use of 
electronic document retention systems). 
 85 Id. 
 86 For example, one article contends that the proposed rule would protect a corporation from sanctions 
for inadvertently permitting a backup tape to be automatically overwritten, but not for failing to prevent 
employees from deleting relevant emails under similar circumstances.  See Elaine Ki Jin Kim, The New 
Electronic Discovery Rules: A Place for Employee Privacy, 115 YALE L.J. 1481 (2006) (citing no authority 
for conclusion).  
 87 See Allman, supra note *, at 209 (suggesting a limitation in Rule 34 on the need to suspend or alter 
“the operation in good faith of disaster recovery or other electronic or computer systems absent court order 
issued upon good cause shown”).   
 88 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-5(c)(1)(A).  See In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. 
Supp. 2d 1342, 1352-59 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (enacted because “sizeable bipartisan majorities of both houses of 
Congress became persuaded that the private securities litigation system was seriously out of balance”).  
 89 See Thomas Allman, The Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, SL088 ALI-ABA 105, 116 (2006) 
(the Advisory Committee did not couple a mandatory discussion of preservation issues with a default 
provision regarding preservation orders because of concern for premature issuance of preservation orders). 
 90 As, for example, the suggestion that saving a single day’s total volume of data generated by an 
enterprise for each lawsuit filed should be made a prerequisite to asserting a preservation safe harbor.  In 
point of fact, of course, such a rigid and impractical requirement would simply require that all information 
be saved forever given the volume of ongoing litigation typically encountered. 
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will be available for use in circumstances where it is clear that reasonable efforts were 
made but losses to discovery nonetheless occurred.  Courts will now have the flexibility 
to identify losses due to “routine, good faith” operations with the help of the Sedona 
Principles, especially Principles 5,91 9,92 1193 and 12.94  Additional help is on the way 
from that quarter.95  Moreover, because the outcome of any particular challenge to 
preservation practices cannot be predicted, a premium will be placed on the development 
and implementation of good faith policies and practices..  
¶38 Seen from this perspective, therefore, Rule 37(f) is analogous to the 
alternative version of the safe harbor under the Private Securities Act (and the equivalent 
SEC Rule) which provides exemption from liability for forward looking statements that 
are made in “good faith” on the basis of reasonable assumptions.96   
¶39 To some, the approach in Rule 37(f) suggests a return to the “pre-Zubulake” 
era, in which a number of courts recognized a broad duty to preserve back-up tapes 
without considering any limitations on g preservation obligations.97  This is clearly a 
misreading of the impact of the amendments in general and Rule 37(f) in particular.   
¶40 For example, when a producing party is faced with making plans for pre-
discovery preservation, the focus on accessibility of information set forth in Rule 
26(b)(2) is far from neutral in its impact.  The clear intention of the Advisory Committee 
in adopting Rule 37(f) was that inaccessible sources of information need not be preserved 
when the party has a reasonable belief in the inaccessibility of the source and in the 
availability of the relevant information on active systems and when the party is acting in 
good faith.98  If decisions are challenged by a motion for sanctions, the test of under Rule 
 
 91 “The obligation to preserve electronic data and documents requires reasonable and good faith efforts 
to retain information that may be relevant to pending or threatened litigation.  However, it is unreasonable 
to expect parties to take every conceivable step to preserve all potentially relevant data.”  Sedona 
Principles, supra note 46, Sedona Principle 5. 
 92 “Absent a showing of special need and relevance a responding party should not be required to 
preserve, review, or produce deleted, shadowed, fragmented or residual data or documents.”  Sedona 
Principles, supra note 46, Sedona Principle 9. 
 93 “A responding party may satisfy its good faith obligation to preserve and produce potentially 
responsive electronic data and documents by using electronic tools and processes, such as data sampling, 
search, or the use of selection criteria, to identify data most likely to contain responsive information.”  
Sedona Principles, supra note 46, Sedona Principle 11. 
 94 “Unless it is material to resolving the dispute, there is no obligation to preserve and produce metadata 
absent agreement of the parties or order of the court.”  Sedona Principles, supra note 46, Sedona Principle 
12. 
 95 As of this writing, two Sedona Commentaries, one on email management and one on litigation holds 
are nearing completion and should be issued for public review and comment by the end of 2006. 
 96 See 17 CFR § 240.3b-6 (identical to Rule 175 of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 CFR §230.175).   
 97 See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at ¶ 50 (Rule 37(f) threatens to undermine the Zubulake 
holding that duty of preservation extended only to backup tapes of “key players” containing otherwise 
unavailable data).  It is not clear, however, just how useful that observation may be from a planning point 
of view.  See Eric Friedberg, To Recycle or Not to Recycle, That is the Hot Backup Tape Question, 201 
PLI/Crim 205 (2005) (“Judge Scheindlin fashioned an exception [in Zubulake] that swallows much of this 
rule”). 
 98 The original Committee Note explaining the “two-tier” rule provided that ”[i]n most instances, a party 
acts reasonably by identifying and preserving reasonably accessible electronically stored information that is 
discoverable without court order.”  ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT (2004), supra note 25, at 34.  Although 
that language was not included in the final Committee Note, the primary reason was that the Advisory 
Committee did not wish to imply that there were no circumstances where otherwise inaccessible sources of 
information did not need to be preserved.  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules 
App. C-44.  As a general proposition, however, the original observation remains valid.  
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37(f) should be whether the preservation process adopted and followed was “reasonably 
calculated” to achieve an appropriate result.99   
¶41 Moreover, once discovery commences, the mandatory requirement in Rule 
26(f) of early discussion and resolution of identified preservation issues - a first for the 
Federal Rules - clearly requires affirmative action by the requesting party with 
knowledge of preservation steps undertaken.  The producing party has the responsibility 
under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) to identify the sources of potentially responsive information 
which it does not intend to search or use for production.  An unsatisfied requesting party 
seeking information must seek an appropriate order100 or waive the right to seek sanctions 
later for non-production.101   
¶42 Finally, the failure of individual users to perfectly comply with vague 
litigation hold instructions is entitled to protection under Rule 37(f).  Delivery of a 
litigation hold notice under reasonable conditions should operate as a rebuttable 
presumption that appropriate steps were undertaken and that any loss despite that notice 
fits within the safe harbor.102  
B. Inherent Power to Sanction 
¶43 A major criticism of Rule 37(f)103 is that it addresses only sanctions under the 
federal rules, which generally do not apply prior to commencement of litigation.104  
Indeed, one Commentator refers to Rule 37(f) as providing only a form of “false harbor” 
 
 99 Sedona Principle 5, supra note 91.  See also STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at 
Rules App. C-83 (“It can be difficult to interrupt the routine operation of computer systems to isolate and 
preserve discrete parts of the information they overwrite, delete, or update on an ongoing basis, without 
creating problems for the larger system.  It is unrealistic to expect parties to stop such routine operation of 
their computer systems as soon as they anticipate litigation.  It is also undesirable; the result would be even 
greater accommodation of duplicative and irrelevant data that must be review, making discovery more 
expensive and time-consuming.”). 
 100 A requesting party may and should seek an order compelling discovery to raise the issue of whether 
the information must be preserved until discoverability is resolved.  See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT 
(2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-43 (noting that producing party may also raise the issue 
affirmatively by a motion for a protective order). 
 101 See, e.g., Applied Telematics v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., No. Civ.A. 94-46031996 WL 33405972 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996) (refusing adverse inference instruction because “plaintiff failed to pursue” other sources to obtain 
the information after learning of its unavailability); see also Treppel v. Biovail, 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (Francis, M.J.) (refusal by requesting party to agree on search methodology was based on “a 
misconception” of the scope of discovery obligations and “a missed opportunity”).    
 102 Implementation of a reasonable “litigation hold” process should be seen as a reason shift the burden 
of proof to a party seeking sanctions.  See Anita Ramasastry, The Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules:  
While Trying to Add Clarity, the Rules Still leave Uncertainty, FindLaw’s Writ (Sept. 14, 2004), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040915.html (“If a party took reasonable steps to notify the 
custodian of electronic information at the company of the need to preserve certain information, it should be 
deemed to have made out a prima facie – that is, an initial, though rebuttable – case that it fits within the 
safe harbor.”). 
 103 I do not accept as serious the argument that Rule 37(f) will somehow mislead federal and state courts 
to the position that no preservation obligations exist until after a civil action is filed.  See Stephen Herman, 
ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials, Proposed Federal Rule Changes on E-Discovery, 2 
Ann.2005 ATLA-CLE 1959 (2005) (reproducing letter of January 19, 2005 to Advisory Committee).  No 
minimally informed litigator or court could possible believe that the Advisory Committee intended such a 
result. 
 104 See David Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing 
that the initial draft of the safe harbor rule would have only very limited impact because it does not 
“abridge” the power of a court to act outside the rules).   
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because courts are likely to ignore Rule 37(f) and apply their inherent power to 
sanction.105  
¶44 Courts often cite their inherent powers to sanction when it is unclear that 
rule-based sanction authority exists.106  Such authority is generally found in Rule 
37(b)(2), which applies when a party fails to obey a discovery order or in Rule 37(c), 
which applies to a failure to make initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) or to supplement 
or amend previous discovery.   
¶45 However, it is unlikely that courts will deliberately invoke their inherent 
power in order to reach a different result on the same facts as would exist under Rule 
37(f).  Most courts understand that the limitation to the “rule-based” qualification was not 
based on anything other than the fact that the Advisory Committee and Standing 
Committee were simply respectful of the limits of rulemaking power.107  Accordingly, the 
natural tendency of most courts will be to use Rule 37(f) as a “guidepost” or reference 
point in exercising their inherent powers.  The power to sanction pre-litigation conduct is 
subject to the Supreme Court’s admonition in Chambers v. Nasco that courts should act 
with great care and only when the Rules “are not up to the task.”108   
¶46 A respect for carefully drafted Rule limitations in the face of more expansive 
inherent power is not unknown.  For example, in the case of Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., the 
Seventh Circuit refused to suggest that a court should exercise its inherent powers to 
sanction discovery misconduct where the District Court had concluded that it lacked 
power to do so because of limitations under Rule 37(b)(2).109  And in Convolve Inc. v. 
Compaq Computer Corp., Magistrate Judge Francis relied upon the intitial version of 
proposed Rule 37(f) in absolving a party of the failure to undertake to preserve certain 
“ephemeral” information in the absence of a discovery order.110  
C. Policy Impact  
¶47 A number of recent articles castigate Rule 37(f) as encouraging improper or 
illegal corporate conduct.  A recent Student Note, for example, asserts that Rule 37(f) 
will “eliminate the possibility of judicial sanctions when parties evade discovery 
requests” because parties can “destroy potentially incriminating documents using a 
 
 105 Henry Noyes, Is E-Discovery So Different That it Requires New Discovery Rules?  An Analysis of 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN. L. REV. 585, 652 (2004) 
(discussing original version of Rule 37(f)). 
 106 See, e.g., Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J 2004) (failure to 
institute a litigation hold).  See Iain Johnston, Federal Courts Authority to Impose Sanctions for 
Prelitigation or Preorder Spoliation of Evidence, 156 F.R.D. 313 (1994) (“the two main sources for 
remedying acts of spoliation are Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and the courts’ inherent authority to 
sanction”). 
 107 As early as its October, 2003 meeting, the Advisory Committee had been concerned about its 
authority to promulgate a preservation rule that applied prior to commencement of litigation under the 
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077.  See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting 
(Oct. 2-3, 2003), at 37 (preservation guidance may be beyond the “proper scope” of the Enabling Act). 
 108 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). 
 109 30 F.3d 752, 756 n.9 (7th Cir. 1994).  The Seventh Circuit admitted that the lower court had the 
authority to act under its inherent authority to sanction parties for discovery abuse but refused to find an 
abuse of discretion despite the “troubling” actions highlighted below.  
 110 223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D.NY. 2004). 
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document retention policy.”111  Further, since “the rules are biased in favor of big 
companies,” they will “make their electronic document storage system as inaccessible as 
possible.”112  Other articles predict that Rule 37(f) will cause “corporations” to “adopt 
comprehensive data deletion” based on “purported” good-faith desire to reduce data 
storage costs113 because “[the] subversion of document retention policies is shared by 
many in corporations across America.”114   
¶48 This type of ad hominem attack on private corporations is quite unfair.  First, 
it ignores the fact that public entities have been equally strong in their support for a 
preservation safe harbor.115  Second, it also ignores the ample civil and criminal sanctions 
applicable to those who might decide to act in to avoid their obligations in discovery.  As 
the Standing Committee Report noted in response to an analogous argument about Rule 
26(b)(2)(B), “a party that makes information “inaccessible” because it is likely to be 
discoverable in litigation is subject to sanctions now and would still be subject to 
sanctions under the proposed rule changes.”116  
¶49 Generally speaking, an entity has the right to manage and dispose of its  
information.  See The Sedona Guidelines:  Best Practice Guidelines & Commentary for 
Managing Information & Records in the Electronic Age (Sedona Conference Working 
Group Series, September 2005), Guideline 3: “An organization need not retain all 
electronic information ever generated or received.”  Indeed, the Supreme Court endorsed 
this principle in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States.117  
¶50 However, corporate policies involving destruction of information sought in 
discovery must be both reasonable in purpose and reasonable as applied in a particular 
case.118  It is not, for example, reasonable to institute a policy to intentionally destroy 
information for the primary purpose of preventing a known future adversary from 
obtaining the information in litigation.   See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies, 
220 F.R.D. 264, 286 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[E]ven valid purging programs need to be put on 
hold when litigation is reasonably foreseeable”).119 
¶51 Moreover, criminal sanctions may be implicated by deliberate attempts to 
withhold information in anticipation of certain types of proceedings.  For example, in the 
 
 111 Rebecca Rockwood, Shifting Burdens and Concealing Electronic Evidence: Discovery in the Digital 
Era, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16, at ¶ 28 (2005). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Daniel Garrie et al., Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: Amending The Federal Rules to Accommodate 
Electronic Discovery, 25 REV. LITIG. 115, 128 (Winter 2006). 
 114 Lloyd van Oostenrijk, Paper or Plastic?: Electronic Discovery and Spoliation In The Digital Age, 42 
HOUS. L. REV. 1163, 1185 (2005). 
 115 Withers astutely notes that the proposal for a safe harbor “was grounded in the fear of many in 
corporate America (and in the government sector) that electronic information systems were far too large 
and complex to manage with the degree of certainty needed to fulfill the duty of preservation, and that no 
party should face sanctions arising out of circumstances beyond their control.”  See Withers, supra note 4, 
at 207. 
 116 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-45.  
 117 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (Document retention policies are “common in business” and may be used 
to explain - and justify - the loss of information in appropriate circumstances.).   
 118 See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F. 3d 739, 747-48 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding sanctions 
for destruction of voice tape pursuant to retention policy). 
 119 Compare Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C-00-20905 RMW, 2006 WL 565893 (N.D. 
Cal.) with Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:05CV406, 2006 WL 2038417 (E.D. Va.) 
(involving same course of conduct but with differing interpretations of the corporate motives involved). 
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wake of the Enron scandal, Congress stiffened existing criminal penalties and added new 
violations for one who knowingly alters or destroys documents with the intent to impede 
a federal investigation or proceeding or “in relation to or contemplation of such matter or 
case.”120 
D. Disincentive to Invest 
¶52  Nathan Drew Larsen argues that by focusing on losses which result from 
“routine” operations the Advisory Committee has inadvertently created an incentive in 
Rule 37(f) for producing parties to fail to invest in technology which is less destructive of 
data.121   
¶53 This argument is a variation of the contention that Rule 37(f) will encourage 
producing parties to place information into inaccessible sources to avoid preservation and 
production obligations and is equally fallacious.  It ignores the fact that the moving force 
in information technology is not litigation but business concerns.122  As the Standing 
Committee Report notes: “[M]any witnesses and comments [at the Public Hearings] 
rejected the argument that the rule would encourage entities or individuals to “bury” 
information that is necessary or useful for business purposes or that regulations or 
statutes require them to retain.”123  Moreover, the argument overstates the intended 
purpose of that phrase.  A “routine” operation is merely part of process.124  Its use in Rule 
37(f) is not intended to freeze technological innovation but merely to indicate that the 
feature causing the loss is typically part of the system at that time.125  
 
 120 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002). As one in-house lawyer testified at the Public Hearing of January 12, 2005, 
“I think it would be insanity beyond belief for anybody, any serious lawyer, to advise their client that, oh, 
yeah, this is a way to get rid of something that might come back to bite us.  Because the moment you have 
that thought you’re engaging in basically criminal conduct.”  Public Hearing Comments, supra note 8, 
Testimony of Greg McCurdy (Jan. 12, 2005) (04-CV-001), at 10. 
 121 Larsen, supra note 6, at 226.  The author also argues that a “routine” operation is synonymous with 
one which is “customary,” as judged by the practice of other entities, which could create an incentive for 
industry to collude “either explicitly or tacitly” to reduce litigation risk by configuring their systems in a 
manner more destructive of data.  Id. 
 122 The General Counsel of Intel Corporation testified at the San Francisco Public Hearing that while it 
would be feasible to recast backup media into a method that would be more searchable, there would be no 
reason for that to be done from a business sense since backup tapes perform their function well.  Public 
Hearing Comments, supra note 8,  Testimony of Bruce Sewell (Jan. 12, 2005) (004-CV-016), at 16 
(“[F]rankly, I have enough grief within my job [just] trying to manage [the legal] business”). 
 123 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules App. C-44 to -45. 
 124 An example of such useage is when spoliation sanctions are not imposed for destruction of 
information pursuant to a document retention policy which occurs “[as] a matter of routine with no 
fraudulent intent.”  Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3rd Cir. 1983)).  
 125 Prof. Redish argued in 2003 that a safe harbor’s viability should be tested by comparing it to industry 
practice “and the reach of currently available technology.”  Letter from Martin Redish, Professor of Law, to 
Lee Rosenthal, Judge (Dec. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/ed52.pdf.  He contended that a litigant should not be 
permitted to adopt an “unnecessarily aggressive document destruction policy.”  Id.  This would appear to 
impose conditions beyond that adopted by the Advisory Committee in  Rule 37(f), which is both 
technology neutral and properly takes no position on what level of investment is required.  The Redish 
proposal, however, was based on requiring only a “reasonable” program for destruction of information and 
lacked the requirement that the program be operated in “good faith” as is now present in Rule 37(f).  That 
requirement provides additional and sufficient protection from the concern about improper motive raised by 
Prof. Redish. 
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E. Vague Standard 
¶54 The “good faith” standard of Rule 37(f) has also been criticized as too vague 
because parties will “continue to be subject to varying standards for determining when 
sanctions should be imposed.”126   
¶55 There is, of course, some truth to that observation.  However, Courts are 
often called upon to apply standards involving an assessment of “good faith” to 
determine exemptions from liability127 or to assess rights and obligations.128  
¶56 In applying Rule 37(f) on a case-specific basis,129 Courts will be employing 
the classic “excluder” function attributed to Professor Robert Summers.130  Under this 
astute observation, “good faith” has no inherent meaning, but serves to exclude examples 
of bad faith conduct, which are identified on an ad hoc basis over time.  For example, as 
the Committee Note makes clear, willful continuance of an operation involving 
destruction when preservation obligations are known are to be excluded from being 
treated as a “routine, good faith” operation of that system.131  In Mosaid Technologies v. 
Samsung Electronics, for example, the producing party made no attempt to justify its 
failure to modify the automatic deletion of e-mail for several years, thereby making it 
impossible to produce any of the technical email needed in the patent litigation.  The 
destruction in that case was neither routine nor in good faith.132 
¶57  Assessing losses against a “good faith” standard presents a subjective issue, 
which may vary from case to case, since the personnel involved “may well have been 
 
 126 Van Oostenrijk, supra note 114, at 1201 (questioning whether a line can be drawn between negligent 
and reckless or intentional conduct and whether the difference rally matters). 
 127 Examples include the Delaware Business Judgment Rule  and the alternative safe harbor under the 
Private Securities and Rule 3b-6 of the Securities Act of 1934 under which a safe harbor from liability can 
only be defeated by proof of actual knowledge of the false or misleading nature of a forward-looking 
statement subject to the rule.  See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01, Amer. Law Inst. (1994) (“a 
director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills [his duty to perform his functions 
in good faith] if the director or officer… (3)  rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best 
interests of the corporation”); Eric Freidman, Changing Currents for Directors’ Duties, CORPORATE LAW 
AND PRACTICE, Practicing Law Inst. (2005) (the business judgment rule provides exculpation from personal 
liability for bad business decisions).  
 128 See Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 1975) (a lack of “good faith” in 
administering contract involves actions “not prompted by an honest mistake but rather by some interested 
or sinister motive”).  See generally Gerard Mantese, The UCC and Keeping the (Good) Faith, 70 MICH. 
BUS. L.J. 270 (1991). 
 129 See Reilly v. Natwest Martkets Groups, Inc., 181 F. 3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1119 (2000). 
 130 See Robert Summers, ’Good Faith’ in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).  See also Robert Summers, The General Duty of Good 
Faith – Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) (summarizing 
developments in the ensuing period and clarifying the meaning of “good faith” in a variety of contexts). 
 131 It is clear that a party may not “exploit” a routine operation “in order to destroy specific stored 
information that it is required to preserve.”  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (2005), supra note 12, at Rules 
App. C-87 (The Committee Note points out that “good faith” may require active intervention in the routine 
operation of some inaccessible sources of information as part of a “litigation hold.”). 
 132 Mosaid Technologies v. Samsung Electronics, 348 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J. 2004).  See also 
Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 169 (D. Colo. 1990) (the Court 
determined that a producing party acted willfully when it destroyed a copy of a source code it knew would 
be the subject of a discovery request and therefore the destruction “could not be excused as a bona fide 
business practice”). 
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guided by different mental states.”133  For example, a typical email management policy134 
requires that users identify and save email and attachments that meet business, regulatory 
or other criteria and delete the rest.  Much as paper records are thrown away by 
employees making judgment calls about the necessity of retaining information and 
automatic deletion is often used to enforce the policy.  This avoids the need for excessive 
storage and unnecessary review during discovery and also reduces the risk of inadvertent 
production of privileged information.   
¶58 Thus, if information is lost by user or automatic action, the “good faith” 
criterion will help distinguish among those situations where sanctions should be applied 
and those where they should not.135  There will be examples of lax or negligent oversight 
which may still qualify as “good faith.”136   
¶59 The practice of recycling backup media presents a similar issue.  These 
sources of ESI are not generally used for ongoing business purposes and can be difficult 
and costly to access.137  Under some circumstances, a duty may exist to suspend their 
recycling and preserve them for potential discovery.138  However, due to the complexity 
 
 133 Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F. 3d 896, 903 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[V]ariances in key personnel, 
nuances in fact situations or even different credibility assessments of identical evidence can lead to varying 
conclusions about the formation of a corporate intent.”). 
 134 There is an important distinction between obligations adopted as a matter of policy to retain 
information because of business or regulatory requirements and the duty to preserve information for 
discovery in litigation.  Most preservation obligations arise as a necessary implication of the common-law 
of sanctions and relate to the need to preserve information for trial.  See Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 
271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001).  However, retention policies can involve literally thousands of regulatory 
requirements also which require that entities act to retain information in addition to those which business 
requirements require.  Only a few of the underlying regulatory requirements expressly or automatically 
mandate or create preservation obligations enforceable by the law of sanctions in litigation.  See Byrnie v. 
Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (for a preservation obligation to attach, 
“the party seeking the inference must be a member of the general class that the regulatory agency sought to 
protect in promulgating the rule”). 
 135 For example, deletion of information may occur despite a duty to preserve but not prevent its 
recovery from other sources.  See Se. Med. Supply, Inc. v. Boyles, Moak & Brickell Ins., Inc., 822 So. 2d. 
323 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), where computer files were destroyed pursuant to a routine business procedure 
“in good faith” and without any prejudice to the case.  Deletion of information pursuant to policy, but 
without notice to opposing counsel after institution of litigation, might qualify if done without intention to 
interfere with the litigation.  Compare ABC Home Health Serv., Inc. v. IBM, Corp., 158 F.R.D. 180 (S.D. 
Ga. 1994) (applying an adverse inference instruction regarding lost files despite the fact that the requesting 
party never complained about their loss, important files in controversy were not deleted and the court did 
not find intentional deletion).  
 136 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, No. Civ.A. 03-72265, 2005 WL 3502172 
(E.D. Mich.) (failure to prevent automatic deletion of email was merely negligent and not willful).    
 137 See Public Hearing Comments, Testimony of Ed Amdahl (Feb. 14, 2005) (04-CV-241), at 2 (noting 
that daily back-ups to tape are made in order to have disaster recovery capabilities, that they are not 
accessed in the ordinary course of business and that approximately 100 tapes are taken offsite daily at a 
cost of $9,500 a day which, if not recycled, would cost in excess of $3.5M a year). 
 138 While there is some authority suggesting that corporations need not routinely preserve backup tapes, 
exceptions posited to that rule render it ineffective as a planning principle.  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 
LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y.  2003) (“Zubulake IV”) (while a general obligation to keep all 
backup tapes would “cripple” a corporation, tapes containing information about “key players” should be 
kept if the information is not otherwise available). The net result, not surprisingly, is advice from many 
outside counsel to the effect that all recycling of backup tapes should be suspended upon the first hint of 
any meaningful litigation.   
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of the issue and without clear guidelines on when that duty is triggered, it is often 
difficult to consistently implement the duty to act.139  
¶60 One compelling indicia of “good faith” will be if there is evidence that the 
loss occurred during an operation pursuant to a reasonable policy in the absence of 
improper motive.  In this regard, Rule 37(f) reflects the existing law in a majority of 
Circuits, which hold that a court should not issue an adverse inference instruction unless 
there is an affirmative showing of intentional destruction amounting to “bad faith.”140  
One recent article, otherwise critical of Rule 37(f), acknowledges that the Rule will 
authorize the “general use of electronic document retention systems.”141  To paraphrase 
Justice Stewart in another context, the advantage to Rule 37(f) is that courts will know 
“good faith” when they see it.142 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶61 Rule 37(f) represents a carefully considered policy judgment reconciling two 
sometimes competing policy considerations: the need for preservation of potentially 
responsive ESI for use in litigation and the need to minimize the unnecessary intrusion 
into productive use of the systems involved.  Its impact is carefully targeted and depends 
upon court endorsement, which cannot be gamed in advance.  Spoliation of potential 
evidence “occurs along a continuum of fault- ranging from innocence through the degrees 
of negligence to intentionality.”143  Rule 37(f) reflects a judgment that as to ESI lost 
through the routine operation of information system, only when fault lies along the higher 
ends of that spectrum are sanctions to be used.    
Rule 37(f) should help to encourage public and private entities alike to act in good faith 
and undertake reasonable steps to accommodate preservation needs.  Both requesting and 
producing parties have an interest in its effective use, which complements the other 
advances in the e-discovery amendments.  It hopefully provides a template for those 
courts which face similar requests for sanctions under their inherent powers.  As such, it 
more than meets the original intent of the proponents and should endure in its appropriate 
role for many years to come. 
 
 139 See Keir v. Unumprovident Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8781(DLC), 2003 WL 21997747, *13 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (despite good faith efforts to comply with a preservation order, the court nonetheless faced a 
situation where certain of the backup tapes supporting the 888 computer servers were “lost” due “to the 
fault of no one”).   
 140 See Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F. 3d 896, 901-3 (8th Cir. 2004) (reversing adverse inference jury 
instruction because of lack of intentional destruction on the part of claims agent). Compare Residential 
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107-8 (2d Cir. 2002) (adverse inference sanctions can 
be available in the Second Circuit when ESI is lost as the result of merely negligent conduct).  Rule 37(f) 
clearly supersedes that holding in the limited situation where a loss of ESI results from the routine, good 
faith operation of an information system.   
 141 Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at ¶ 49. 
 142 Responsible producing parties generally “get it.”  The author argued at the Fordham Conference that 
“it is my impression [from] talking with many corporate executives from different companies that they now 
all understand their preservation obligations.  The real test ought to be whether or not in good faith they 
have attempted to meet those obligations.”  Panel Discussions, supra note 57, at 76. 
 143 Welsh v. United States, 844 F. 2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988). 
